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."©Specific contracts were concluded at the enterprise level between the actual Planning the Supply of Weapons 101producer and consumer.This is where the detail of price, quantity, and assort-ment was thrashed out.The signature of specific contracts marked the closureof the contract campaign.In aggregate, specific contracts were supposed tofulfill overall plans in conformity with master delivery agreements settledbetween supplier and consumer ministries on one hand and model contractson the other."`"The side of the supplier bore primary responsibility for designing modelcontracts, master delivery agreements, and specific contracts.In the course ofnegotiation with purchasers, a mass of disputes and conflicts naturally arose.Conciliation could be pursued directly or through the state arbitration courtsof Gosarbitrazh.The latter was organized hierarchically so that the level atwhich a review was held corresponded with the status of the contending par-ties.Thus a dispute among enterprises of the same ministry would be settledby intra-departmental arbitration.The arbitration system also reviewed thefulfillment of contractual terms and imposed penalties on violators (Belova2005).The high degree of secrecy and priority in matters pertaining to defenseindustry affected procedures for resolving disputes between buyer and seller.An STO resolution of November 28, 1931, established a special financial andtechnical arbitration commission within the ministry of the workers andpeasants inspection to examine disputes over military orders.In 1934 theinspection ministry was abolished and the arbitration commission was re-placed by a new special procedure.Disputes were taken out of the hands oflocal arbitration agencies and centralized under the chief arbitration officer regardless of the sum at stake. " " Because the chief arbitration officer wasimmediately overwhelmed by the resulting caseload, in 1936 he fixed a mini-mum value for the cases that he would review, the requirement being initially10,000 and later 25,000 rubles (see Chapter 3).Actions for smaller sums overmilitary orders not classified as secret were relegated to the ordinary arbitra-tion procedure."d"In short, the process of contracting arose from the annual planning process,and most of the problems that arose in planning also cropped up in the con-tract campaigns.We will take the campaign of 1940 in the ministry of arma-ment as an example.The preparatory stage began before the government had issued the frame-work resolutions.In mid-September 1939 the ministry of armament issued itsown decree no.264, On preparation for the conclusion of contracts for1940. "e" It ordered enterprise directors, in consultation with operationalstaff for supply, sales, and finance, and legal advisers, to review the operatingsystems for contractual relations and master delivery agreements and pre- 102 Andrei Markevichsent proposals to the chief administrations and trusts not later than October 1,1939.The trusts and chief administrations in turn were to draft the masterdelivery agreements and model contracts and present them to the ministry ofarmament arbitration staff by October 5 for transmission upward to the min-ister by October 15.This decree turned out to be premature given that the 1940 plan assign-ments for the ministry and its enterprises remained unknown; in consequence,its deadlines could not be realized.They were revised in subsequent decrees ofthe government and ministry.The Sovnarkom decree of November 8 On theconclusion of contracts for 1940, served to signal the real start of the con-tracts campaign."" Producer ministries were to provide master delivery agree-ments for an appended list of commodities by November 20.Deadlines werealso given for the conclusion of specific contracts.Ministers now circulated the corresponding decrees in their own fiefs.An-other such decree appeared in the armament ministry; the decree no.264 thathad preceded it was forgotten.Table 4.2 shows that the new ministerial decreerequired the master delivery agreements and model contracts to be draftedwithin more compressed deadlines than the center had envisaged, except fordeliveries to other (therefore unimportant) purchasers.This was motivatedpartly by the minister s desire to play safe and insure against the natural ten-dency of those below to ignore deadlines, and partly by a desire to give enter-prises extra time for the negotiation of the contracts themselves.The ministrywanted its master delivery agreements confirmed by November 10, and byNovember 15 a model plan for conclusion of agreements for 1940 in quan-titative and summary terms. This was at the same time that chief administra-tions were typically embarking on the first draft of enterprise productionprograms for the coming year (Markevich 2004).For conclusion of the spe-cific contracts the ministry decree repeated the government deadlines.Responsibility for the timely conclusion and the appropriateness of contractswas laid personally on enterprise directors and heads of chief administrationsand others at the equivalent levels.All were obliged to report progress to theministry.A deputy minister was given personal charge of the contracts cam-paign as a whole.Its progress would be monitored by the ministerial arbitrationand inspection officers.""Despite the theoretical coherence of the contracts campaign, its implemen-tation was still a complex process.Of the thirty-nine master delivery agree-ments that the ministry of armament central administration of material supplyshould have signed with suppliers, none was ready by the November 20 dead-line, and twenty-eight remained unsigned by the first of 1940."" Things werehardly better with the specific contracts and master delivery agreements that Table 4.2.The 1940 contracts campaign in the ministry of armament: Government and minis-terial deadlinesMinistry ofGovernment armament Agency responsible within thedeadlinea deadlineb ministry of armamentModel contracts and master de-livery agreementsFor items to be received by enter-prises and agencies of the minis-try of armamentFrom other ministries Nov.d"`" Nov." Central administration of mate-rial supply in consultation withchief administrationsFrom Oboronpromsnabc Nov.d"`" Oct.d"" Central administration of mate-rial supplyFor items of mass consumption Nov.d"`" Oct.d"" Mass consumption trustto be supplied by enterprises andagencies of the ministry of arma-mentFor items to be supplied for inter- Nov.d"`" Nov. " Department of cooperation (i.e.,mediate use by enterprises within intra-ministry subcontracting)the ministry of armamentFor items to be supplied by enter-prises and agencies of the minis-try of armamentTo basic purchasers i.e., Nov.d"`" Nov. " Ministrythe ministries of defense, thenavy, and NKVDTo other ministerial pur- Nov.d"`" Nov.d"" Chief production administrationschasers Specific contractsFor mass consumption items Dec.d"`" Dec.d"`"
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