[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.It is also plausible to argue thatsuch reliance on the experts made AIPAC s executive director and stafffree agents, unless major conflicts with other core values or relationshipsresulted.Such limits began to be felt during the Israeli siege of Beirut in1982 and the 1987 Intifada; unease was also felt by many liberal Jews overlinks with the Christian Right.Finally, the role of Likudniks within theorganization can be seen as determinative, effectively denying those withconflicting views access to the levers of influence.These issues did not gel until the election of Menachem Begin in 1977.Particularly between 1951 and 1967 the task before Si Kenen and AIPACwas straightforward: to build a relationship with the Congress that would,year after year, increase economic and political support for Israel.Aid toIsrael increased from $35 million in 1951 to $126.8 million in 1966; of the$1.12 billion total, some $367.4 million were grants, the remainder beingloans on favorable terms.The Export Import Bank granted $126.2 millionin loans during the same period (Mark 2002).Those numbers should The pro-Israel community prior to 1981 25however be compared to reparations paid by Germany, which averaged $125million per year during the same period (90 percent of which were grants),and contributions from world Jewry, predominantly American Jews, whichaveraged $200 million per year before 1967 (Safran 1978: 123).Harder to measure, but in the long term more important, was Kenen squiet success in building a solid base of supporters in Congress, and incoordinating with other pro-Israel organizations and the Israeli governmentto ensure access as issues arose.Kenen had many friends in Congress, includ-ing Hubert Humphrey, who stood guard for Israel in the Senate for 25years, and Humphrey s aide Max Kampelman (Kenen 1981: 80).Kenenworked closely with NCRAC s staff in New York, and with YehudaHellman, executive director of the Presidents Conference.Ambassador Ebanwas an invisible fourth partner, involved in planning, lobbying and medi-ating with prickly Jewish leaders (Goldberg 1996: 154).AIPAC was a shoestring professional operation with five employees,including a secretary in a New York office (where major Jewish organi-zations were headquartered) and a former Ben-Gurion aide looking forcooperative local leaders (Kenen 1981: 70).Until 1966, Kenen often wentwithout his meagre salary, and even lent money to the operation.The Amitay era of AIPACIn December 1974, Morris Amitay, aide to Senator Ribicoff, replacedKenen.With Richard Perle, aide to Senator Jackson, Amitay had just engi-neered the Jackson Vanik amendment conditioning trade benefits to theSoviet Union on treatment of Soviet Jews.Amitay, a lawyer and formerForeign Service officer, evoked some resentment with confrontational andretributive methods.He saw that after the 1973 war, prevailing aid levelsand the $250 million pledged to the United Jewish Appeal would notsuffice; Israel required billions (Tivnan 1987: 83).After the 1974 organi-zational changes in Congress, he needed to be able to educate members andstaff outside the small network of key chairmen and staff with whom Kenenhad worked.He wanted more staff, more research capability and crediblecapacity to reward and punish.In 1975, AIPAC s ability to block the president was tested.Secretary ofState Kissinger, frustrated by the Rabin government s positions in Sinaiwithdrawal negotiations, had President Ford send Rabin a blunt letter,expressing profound disappointment with Israel s attitude and announc-ing a reassessment of United States policy in the region, including our rela-tions with Israel (Rabin 1996: 256).Arms awaiting delivery weresuspended.Within days, AIPAC obtained the signatures of 76 senators on aletter to Ford, supporting economic aid to Israel and urging Ford to base anyreassessment on the premise that the United States stands firm with Israelin the search for peace (Spiegel 1986: 296).9 Signed by senators on the right(Thurmond, Goldwater) and the left (Kennedy, McGovern), the letter 26 The pro-Israel community prior to 1981seemed a promise of trouble for any policy of pressure on Israel.However,President Ford did not attempt to dissuade the senators, and might havesucceeded; it is much easier to sign a vague warning shot letter than torefuse a president s personal request for latitude in foreign policy, and evenstrong supporters of Israel were uncomfortable with what they had done
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]