[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
. 138 Why Leaders Choose WarOn March 17, in a public address, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein anultimatum: Leave the country within forty-eight hours or the U.S.-led coali-tion would invade and remove the current Iraqi regime from power.Bushcited as reasons for the invasion Saddam Hussein s flouting of internationallaw and the thirteen resolutions passed by the United Nations; the Iraqi re-gime s previous use of biological weapons against its own people; the regime scontinuing efforts to obtain WMD; its reckless aggression against neighboringcountries and its own people; and its links with terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda.142 Saddam defiantly replied that he would not leave, and on March 19,the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq began.143THE RHETORIC OF WAR: REVISITINGTHE PREVENTIVE WAR FACTORSWhat can we say at this point of the psychological factors that influencedBush s decision to go to war? One of the most apparent factors was Bush sperception of Saddam Hussein.His image of Hussein had several importantfacets.He believed the Iraqi leader to be untrustworthy, he believed him tobe aggressive, and he believed him to be a risk-taker.These three separateconvictions combined to imply to Bush that Saddam was not deterrable, inany conventional sense.His untrustworthiness implied that any inspectionsregime, any international agreement that was signed, was not enough.Bush s perception of Saddam as deceitful was so ingrained that any con-flicting information (Saddam appearing to comply with UN resolutions)would be either ignored or rationalized as a ploy.Thus, in an interview withDiane Sawyer, Bush declared:   I wouldn t trust a word he said.He he sdeceived and lied to the world in the past.He s not going to change hisstripes.  144Similarly, after Hussein agreed to comply with UN inspections in earlySeptember 2002, Bush declared:   All they ve got to do is look at his record,his latest ploy.He s not going to fool anybody.  145 What Bush really meantwas that he would not be fooled by Saddam Hussein.That Bush believed Saddam to be aggressive is indicated by his repeatedreference to Saddam s invasions of Kuwait and Iran, his attempt to assassinatea former U.S.president, and his use of biological weapons against Iraqicitizens.Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, in making the case for war, declaredthat no other living dictator matched Saddam s record of aggression.146The third notion, the supposed irrationality of Saddam Hussein, reinforcedthe belief within the Bush administration that Hussein could not be deterredany longer.Bush s repeated characterization of Saddam as a   madman implies a certain lack of rationality.147 As noted, deterrence involves a degreeof mutual understanding.It can therefore only work when the party being Preventive War as a Grand Strategy? 139deterred understands and cares about the costs and risks of disobeying.If twostates have drastically different ideas of what will happen if one of them  cheats  or disobeys, then deterrence cannot work.For Bush, Saddam s re-peated noncompliance with UN resolutions indicated that he (Saddam) be-lieved he could do so with impunity.These different facets of Bush s view of Saddam Hussein his bad faithimage of the Iraqi leader combined to produce a conclusion, and with thata prescription for action.The conclusion was that because of a variety offactors Saddam was deceitful, aggressive, and irrational Saddam mustgive up power or have it taken from him.The implication, or prescription, ofthis conclusion was that, given past experience, Saddam would not leavepeacefully, he was dangerous, and the United States must therefore act toremove him from power.The second factor that was evident in this case was Bush s belief that aserious conflict was inevitable.There are two elements to this.The first is themore general belief that the United States was already involved in a war onterror, and had been since September 11, 2001.The second is the morespecific idea that a conflict with Iraq was inevitable, in addition to being partof the larger war on terror.A critic could argue that a conflict with Iraq wasinevitable only because Bush pushed the country to the brink of war, and itwas therefore bound to invade Iraq eventually [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

  • zanotowane.pl
  • doc.pisz.pl
  • pdf.pisz.pl
  • windykator.keep.pl
  • Strona pocz±tkowa
  • 2%2BPsychologia%2BSpo%25C5%2582%2B %2BKsi%25C4%2585zka%2B%2528Serce%2BI%2BUmys%25C5%2582%2B %2BAronson%2529
  • Martin Bobgan, Deidre Bobgan James Dobson's Gospel of Self Esteem & Psychology (1998)
  • Chris A Jackson [Scimitar Sea Scimitar War (retail) (epub) id
  • Jason A. Edwards Navigating the Post Cold War World, President Clinton's Foreign Policy Rhetoric (2008)
  • wywieranie wpływu na ludzi psychologia społeczna [found via www.filedonkey.com]
  • You Can't Get Much Closer Than This Combat with the 80th Blue Ridge Division in World War II Europe
  • Nicholson Helen J. Love, War and the Grail, Templars, Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights 1150 1500(1)
  • Patricia Richard Busy Hands, Images of the Family in the Northern Civil War Effort (2003)
  • Philip Gordon, Jeremy Shapiro Allies At War, America, Europe and the Crisis Over Iraq (2004)
  • Heather Cox Richardson West from Appomattox, The Reconstruction of America after the Civil War (2007)
  • zanotowane.pl
  • doc.pisz.pl
  • pdf.pisz.pl
  • nowe.htw.pl