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.1914Records of the PCC meeting on the PHP website, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/col-lection_3/PCC_meetings/coll_3_PCC_1956.htm.15Gen.Ivan Tretiak, quoted in Matthew Evangelista, Why Keep Such an Army?, pp.10 11.16Excerpt from speech by Khrushchev at closed session of the Polish party central committee,March 20, 1956, Cold War International History Project Bulletin 10 (1998): 31.17Record of Moscow meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders, June 22 23, 1956, 64/230, TsDA.18Referred to in the record of GomuÅ‚ka Zhou Enlai conversations, January 11 12, 1957, inKrzysztof Persak, Polsko-%0Å„ínské rozhovory v lednu 1957 [The Polish Chinese Conversations inJanuary 1957], Soudobé d%1Å‚jiny [Prague] 4, no.2 (1997): 337 66, at p.347.19V.K.Volkov, #7;>2K5 ?@>1;5259H59 8AB>@88 AB@0= &5=B@0;L=>9 8.3>->A-B>G=>9 2@>?K [Key Problems in the Recent History of the Countries of Central and South-eastern Europe] (Moscow: Indrik, 2000), pp.170 71.7 The landmark Soviet declaration on relations among socialist countries of Oct-ober 30 had important implications for the Warsaw Pact.It announced Moscow sintention to recall its unwanted military advisers from Eastern Europe and start dis-cussions about ending the similarly unwelcome presence of Soviet troops in Poland,Hungary, and Romania.The document further stated that any deployment of troopsfrom one country of the alliance to another should only take place by agreementamong all of their governments and with the explicit consent of the government affect-ed.The inclusion of the statement suggested that the Kremlin at that time was stillhoping to resolve the mounting Hungarian crisis by political means rather than theuse of force.20The Soviet military intervention in Hungary that followed a few days later hasbeen widely but erroneously regarded as having been triggered by the decision ofthe Budapest government to leave the Warsaw Pact.In reality, the Kremlin hadalready reversed itself in the morning of October 31 when it decided to dispatchtroops into Hungary before reformist premier Imre Nagy later in the day told a massrally in Budapest that his government had begun to negotiate about terminating thecountry s obligations under the Warsaw Treaty, which in fact it had not done.Thedeclaration by the Nagy government on the following day that announced Hungary swithdrawal from the alliance and asked for recognition of its neutrality under UnitedNations auspices was by then a desperate and unsuccessful attempt to stay the Sovietinvasion already in progress.21The October 30 declaration was not without potentially disruptive effects on theRomanian and Polish membership in the Warsaw Pact as well.The day after it wasissued, which was the day the Soviet party presidium authorized the invasion, theBucharest politburo decided to demand the withdrawal of Soviet forces and advis-ers from Romania as party chief Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, impressed by Moscow swillingness to withdraw them from Austria the year before, had already unsuccess-fully attempted to do in August 1955.With Soviet troops pouring into Romania ontheir way to Hungary, however, the time was not propitious, and Romanians chosenot to raise the issue.22The Poles were not similarly inhibited.Even while Hungary was being forciblyreintegrated into the alliance, the Polish general staff established a special commis-sion to seek a radical reform of the Warsaw Pact and renegotiation of Poland s sta-20The English text of the declaration is in Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne and János M.Rainer,The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents (Budapest: Central European UniversityPress, 2002), pp.300 302.21Document no.3.Soviet troops already present in Hungary began to move on November 1,and a massive invasion of additional forces through Romania began on November 4. 0: @5H0-;8AL 2>?@>cK 5=3@88 : 01>G85 70?8A8 @57848CO1@L 1956 3. [Howthe Hungarian Problems Were Solved: The Working Minutes of the Presidium of the CPSUCentral Committee, July November 1956], Istoricheskii Arkhiv, 1996, nos.2 3.22Summary of meeting of Romanian politburo, October 31, 1956, file 359/1956, pp.1 2, PoliticalBureau Records Group.Archives of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers Party,ANR.On the 1955 attempt, undertaken through politburo member Emil Bodnra, see DennisDeletant, Communist Terror in Romania: Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State, 1948 1965 (London:Hurst, 1999), pp.273 74.8 tus in it.Deputy chief of staff Gen.Jan Drzewiecki wrote a biting commentary onthe controversial Statute of the Unified Command and a devastating legal analysisof the bilateral agreements through which Moscow controlled the long-term devel-opment of Poland s armed forces.He found the agreements without legal basis andnot really bilateral because they obligated one side only.23In a memorandum urging reform of the Warsaw Pact, Drzewiecki did not ques-tion its merit, which he saw in its protecting Poland against the supposed Germanthreat, but rather its provisions.Besides taking exception to the supranational sta-tus of the supreme commander and his staff that gave them prerogatives incompat-ible with Poland s independence and sovereignty, the document lambasted the mem-ber-states purely formal representation on the unified command, the arbitraryassignment of their respective military contributions, and the lack of clarity aboutthe conditions under which an ally s forces may be deployed on another s territoryan issue rendered topical by the Hungarian developments.24The Poles separated their radical critique of the Warsaw Pact from their demandfor regulation of the Soviet military presence in their country, necessary to maintainMoscow s lines of communication with Soviet forces in East Germany.Invoking ananalogy to foreign military personnel stationed in different NATO countries andalluding to the manner in which the U.S.military presence could be made tolerableto such countries as the Philippines, Libya, and Ethiopia, the demand was fortunatein its timing.Faced with worldwide indignation at the bloody suppression of theHungarian revolution, the Soviet Union granted Poland a status-of-forces agreementmore favorable than it accorded any other country.The agreement recognized thehost nation s jurisdiction with regard to violations of Polish law by Soviet soldiersand provided for giving the Warsaw government advance notice of any movementof Soviet troops on Polish territory.While the former provision would henceforthoften be only honored in its breech, the latter would be generally observed.25Still, for much of 1957, the Poles remained black sheep in the alliance.Khrush-chev did not include their representatives among the top party leaders he invited toMoscow in early January to discuss the Hungarian situation and military matters,particularly the sensitive issue of development of Eastern European armed forces.23Document No.4. Analiza strony prawnej dokumentu p.t. Protokol soveshchaniia po planurazvitiia Vooruzhennykh Sil Polskoi Narodnoi Respubliki na 1955 65 gg. oraz nastÄ™pnych pro-tokołów wnoszÄ…cych do niego zmiany [Analysis of the Legal Aspects of the Document Entitled Protocol on the Consultation about the Plan for the Development of the Armed Forces of thePolish People s Republic in 1955 65 and Its Subsequent Amendments], November 3, 1956, microfilm(o) 96/6398, reel W-15, Library of Congress, Washington [LC].24Documents Nos.5 and 6.Cf
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